Russia Expands Drone Production, Marginalizing Iran’s Role

The Russian drone factory in Alabuga is rapidly increasing its production capabilities, primarily focusing on the Iranian-designed Shahed-136 attack drone. This development has significant implications for Iran, as it appears to be sidelined in what was initially a strategic partnership.

Alabuga, located approximately 600 miles east of Moscow in the Tatarstan region, has become the largest drone manufacturing site in Russia. CEO Timur Shagivaleev highlighted the factory’s unique position during a recent television documentary, stating, “This is a complete facility.” He emphasized that most components for the Shahed-136, known in Russia as Geran, are now produced locally, marking a substantial shift in production dynamics. Analysts estimate that around 90% of the drone’s production stages now occur at Alabuga or other Russian facilities.

Recent satellite images indicate that Alabuga is undergoing significant expansion, with new production facilities and dormitories being established. This growth might enable Russia to export an upgraded version of the drone, potentially back to Iran. However, a Western intelligence source has indicated that the integration of the drone production into Russia’s military industrial complex has effectively marginalized Iran in this partnership.

As tensions rise, Tehran has expressed frustration over the lack of reciprocal support from Moscow. Despite assisting Russia with drone and missile supplies during its conflict in Ukraine, Iranian officials feel neglected. Ali Akbar Dareini, an analyst at the Tehran-based Center for Strategic Studies, noted that Iran may have expected more substantial support from Russia, particularly in light of recent Israeli military actions targeting its nuclear facilities.

Following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the two nations entered into a $1.75 billion deal for drone production. By early 2023, this partnership stipulated the manufacture of 6,000 drones by September 2025. Alabuga has exceeded expectations, reportedly producing over 5,500 units per month. Furthermore, the cost of production has drastically decreased, from an average of $200,000 per drone in 2022 to approximately $70,000 in 2025. Improvements in technology have also enhanced the drones’ capabilities, making them more effective in combat situations.

The evolving Russian strategy has not gone unnoticed by Iranian officials. The shift toward local production has led to a gradual reduction in Iran’s control over the final product. A Western intelligence official stated that this evolution signifies Russia’s goal to master the entire production cycle, minimizing dependence on Iranian negotiations.

Despite the apparent rift, some analysts believe that Iran may still benefit from this relationship. As Iran works to rebuild its military capabilities following recent conflicts, there is speculation that Russia might provide updated versions of the Shahed drone to assist Tehran. David Albright, a former UN weapons inspector, suggested that Alabuga’s expansion could serve as a means for Moscow to support Iran in replenishing its drone stockpiles.

On July 11, a Gelix Airlines Ilyushin-76 military cargo plane reportedly flew from Moscow to Tehran, raising further questions about ongoing military cooperation. While the exact contents of the flight remain unconfirmed, Iranian media speculated it included components of a Russian S-400 air defense system.

As the dynamics between Russia and Iran continue to shift, the long-term implications for both nations remain uncertain. While Iran may feel sidelined in the drone production process, analysts like Dareini argue that the partnership still holds potential benefits for Tehran, particularly in military and technological cooperation.

The complexities of this evolving relationship underscore the transactional nature of international alliances, where cooperation often exists alongside competition.